The US is an Arctic nation. Alaska makes it so. Government
officials as well as shippers and carriers could ignore this fact; but doing so
leaves a political and economic vacuum that other nations are looking to fill.
If we embrace the challenges and opportunities that await us in our Arctic
frontier we can open up lucrative avenues for maritime transportation as well
as stake our claim to the wealth to be had there.
The Arctic, much like what used to be called the New World,
is coveted by many nations for its perceived riches and for alternative
transportation routes. While the Arctic may appear desolate and forbidding one
should consider how crowded a region it might become in the future. The US's
claim in the Arctic comes from Alaska; but the other Arctic nations are Norway,
Iceland and Denmark (via Greenland) as well as Russia and Canada. The latter
two are particularly important because the US's 200 nautical miles of
sovereignty beyond the Alaska shoreline are adjacent to theirs. Furthermore,
Russia can challenge the US militarily and is better capable of asserting
itself in the region because of their greater number of icebreakers. Canada's
relationship with the US is complicated, too, because of the two nations'
dispute over the status of the Northwest Passage.
The Northwest Passage was, and may again become, a sought
after shortcut between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The great powers of
Europe wished to find a northern shortcut to the Far East. Many died trying to
find it. However, famed explorer Roald Amundsen discovered a navigable route in
1906. While most of the route Amundsen took is less susceptible to year-round
ice than the alternative route farther north, his route is not amenable to
today's deep draft tankers and container vessels. Nonetheless, the distance
savings using this more northern route is considerable should these waters
become viable in the summer. For example, the Port of London to the Port of
Tokyo is: 15,000 miles via the Panama Canal; 13,000 miles via the Suez Canal;
while only 8,500 miles via the Northwest Passage.
Before the Trans-Alaska Pipeline was announced in 1973
serious thought went into transporting Prudhoe Bay oil to the US East Coast via
the Northwest Passage. Canada and the US disagreed on the status of the
Northwest Passage (and indeed all the waters between Baffin Island and Banks
Island). The issue became dormant after the pipeline was built; but as the
polar ice recedes and the Arctic nations consider their options the Northwest
Passage will become a point of discussion (perhaps even contention). Matters
are complicated for the US and Canada because the US is the only Arctic Nation
which is not a signatory to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). Canada considers the passage to be sovereign to itself while
the US considers the waters to be an international strait giving it the right
of passage without Canada's approval. Of course, if the US presses that view
too far it could not block countries like Russia or China from traversing in the
same way. So it may be best, commercially and militarily, if the US and Canada
reached their own negotiated settlement.
Extending beyond what is known as the contiguous zone under
UNCLOS to a point 200 nautical miles from the baseline is a country's exclusive
economic zone (EEZ). The country cannot prohibit legal passage of vessels and
loitering; but it does have sovereignty over the water column and continental
shelf (which includes mining and oil exploration). Beyond a country's EEZ are
the high seas (or international waters) where no country has exclusive control;
however, if the continental shelf does extend beyond 200 nautical miles the
country may appeal to the United Nations for an extension. Obviously, when two
countries' EEZs overlap disputes can occur. The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Management and Conservation Act (1976) – establishing a US EEZ of 200 nautical
miles – comports with UNCLOS in that area at least. The main implication of the
US not recognizing UNCLOS is that disputes with signatory countries in the
Arctic are harder to solve since the US vis-à-vis Canada, the European Union,
Russia, etc., are not appealing to the same body of law. For example, as the
Northwest Passage becomes a more viable trade route, these disputes may become
more pointed in the coming decades. Basically, bilateral negotiations will have
to occur. However, the UNCLOS countries and the US all have incentives to
explore and map their respective continental shelves into the Arctic. This is
because the region, according to the US Energy Information Administration, is
estimated to contain 22 percent of the world's untapped natural gas and 13
percent of its conventional oil. Combine this with the potential use of the
Northwest Passage and one can understand why China (hardly an Arctic nation) is
showing a keen interest in the area.
Whether it be military exploration or commercial transport, a
realistic Arctic strategy requires the use of icebreakers. Despite our status
as a superpower our ability to explore and project force in the Arctic is
supported by only two operational icebreakers (thePolar
Star and
the Healy). Icebreakers are necessary in order to navigate through the thick and
unpredictable ice floes encountered within the Northwest Passage – even in
summer. In other words, a retreating permanent ice cap may bring about more
navigable waters but at the price of more ice volatility. Whether the US
chooses to build more icebreakers or buy them from other countries (though
unlikely given the Jones Act) the investment will have to be in the multiple
billions of dollars if the demand for commercial transportation grows.
On top of this the US and Canada have yet to resolve a border
dispute in the Beaufort Sea. Naturally, the result will determine ownership of
its potential energy resources. So the heat is on; but this heat may just be
the impetus our federal government needs to get serious about the Arctic in
general, and the Northwest Passage in particular, and thereby deal with the
aspirations of its other Arctic neighbors.
Just like transportation was critical in exploring the New
World so shall it be with the Arctic. Unlike the clashes that occurred among
the European powers over wealth and status within the New World, UNCLOS
provides a framework within which a discussion can take place. Of course, the
US can opt for bilateral negotiations. Perhaps the receding polar ice also
reminds us that the region, though potentially wealthy, is also fragile.
Darren Prokop is a Professor of Logistics with the College
of Business & Public Policy at the University of Alaska, Anchorage. His
latest book, The
Business of Transportation, is available from Praeger Publishers.
